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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Objective 
 
The repeal of Regulation 4056/861 by Regulation 1419/20062 brought effectively tramp 
vessel services into the scope of EC competition rules. This long-standing exclusion of the 
tramp sector from the Community competition implementing rules was considered as an 
anomaly to the achievement of uniformity of the legal regime, since tramp services, 
together with cabotage, were the only remaining sectors to receive such a beneficial 
treatment. The need for a uniform competition law regime became urgent especially after 
the adoption of Regulation 1/2003,3 with which a new decentralised system, by granting 
national competition authorities and national courts the power to apply Article 81 and 82 
EC in their entity, was established.  
 
The expressed reasons for this immunity of the tramp services were related to the 
recognition of competitive elements inherent to the nature of the tramp sector resulting 
from the fact that rates for these services are freely negotiated on a case by case basis in 
accordance with supply and demand conditions.4 Considering however that similar market 
conditions are present in other sectors as well, it appears that the exclusion of tramp 
services should be attributed mainly to political pressure by Member States with high 
interests in shipping (e.g. Denmark and Greece). 
 
The new legal regime created consequently a certain degree of uncertainty to the industry, 
which was for a long time self-regulated. In order to assist the undertakings and the 
associations of undertakings operating tramp vessel services to assess whether their 
agreements are compatible with Article 81 EC, the European Commission issued the 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86, OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, p. 4. 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006, OJ L 269, 28.9.2006, p. 1. 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1. 
4 See 4th Recital of Regulation 4056/86. 
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“Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”5 (hereinafter the Maritime Guidelines). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how Article 81 EC could apply to the tramp 
shipping sector. Throughout this theoretical exercise, an attempt is being made to interpret 
and implement the competition law principles in the light of the common features of the 
sector. At each step, issues that require clarification will be addressed and discussed. More 
specifically, definition of the relevant market for competition law purposes can be proved 
to be a hard task in the case of tramp vessel services due to the structure of the tramp 
market; thus, an identification of the unique characteristics of the sector is necessary for a 
more accurate delineation of the relevant market. Furthermore, tramp shipping pools, the 
principal form of horizontal cooperation in the sector, will be assessed differently 
depending on where the centre of gravity of the pool agreement lies; hence, an analysis of 
the pool’s functions is required. In addition, any restrictive effects caused by the pool have 
to be balanced against possible contributions to social welfare. Summing up, this paper 
attempts to point out and deal with the key issues related to the determination of the 
relevant market and to the assessment of tramp shipping pools in the course of the 
application of Article 81 EC.  
 
1.2 Structure 
 
The analysis is divided into two major parts, one dealing with the definition of the relevant 
market (under 2. Tramp shipping market) and another assessing tramp shipping pools under 
Article 81 EC (under 3. Horizontal agreements in the tramp shipping sector under Article 
81 EC).  
 
The first part starts with defining what constitutes a tramp vessel service. The fact that a 
service amounts as a tramp vessel service is not anymore legally important. Nonetheless, a 
                                                 
5 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, OJ C 245, 26.9.2008, p. 2. 
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reference to the definition is of relevance from a methodological point of view in order to 
limit the scope of this study. Afterwards, an account of the general characteristics of the 
tramp shipping market is provided. A description of those features is important for the 
comprehension of the structure and operation of the tramp sector, and thus, useful when 
defining the relevant market. Finally, the definition of the relevant market under 
competition law is discussed.  
 
A description of tramp shipping pools is the starting point of the second, and more 
extensive, part. Taking into account that pool agreements are the primary form of 
horizontal cooperation in the tramp sector, an enumeration of their common features is 
necessary for the appraisal of their validity under Article 81 EC. Then, the assessment of 
pools under Article 81(1) is taking place. At this point, it is discussed under which 
circumstances pools would fall or not within the prohibition of Article 81(1) EC. Following 
this assessment, it is examined whether pools that infringe Article 81(1) EC may qualify for 
an exemption under Article 81(3). Therefore, a possible fulfillment by tramp pools of each 
of the four cumulative conditions laid down in Article 81(3) EC is discussed. Finally, it is 
considered if pool agreements could benefit from the Specialisation Block Exemption.6  
 
1.3 Delimitation  
 
Pools that are created as a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an 
autonomous economic entity (so called full-function joint ventures) account as mergers and 
they are considered under Regulation 139/20047 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings. Examination of such cases is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Issues arising from the dominant position of undertakings operating in the tramp shipping 
market are a matter of discussion under Article 82 EC. As it was stated earlier, this paper 
deals only with Article 81 EC. 
                                                 
6 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2658/2000, OJ L 304, 5.12.2000, p. 3. 
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p.1. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the reader is required to be familiar with the commonly used 
terms in competition law. Such terms are not explained unless it is regarded necessary for 
the presentation of the topic.  
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2. TRAMP SHIPPING MARKET 
 
2.1 The definition of tramp shipping services 
 
As stated in the Maritime Guidelines,8 the European Commission will adhere to the 
description provided in Article 1(3)(a) of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/869 when defining 
tramp vessel services. According to that definition a tramp vessel service means “the 
transport of goods in bulk or in break-bulk in a vessel chartered wholly or partly to one or 
more shippers on the basis of a voyage or time charter or any other form of contract for 
non-regularly scheduled or non-advertised sailings where the freight rates are freely 
negotiated case by case in accordance with the conditions of supply and demand”. 
 
The abovementioned definition consists of three operational elements, which all have to be 
fulfilled, and of a “competitiveness” assumption.10 The method of shipment (“…in bulk or 
break bulk…”), the method of contracting (…chartered wholly or partly to one or more 
shippers on the basis of a voyage or time charter or any other form of contract…”) and the 
sailings’ characteristics (…non-regularly scheduled or non-advertised…) are basically a 
description of the traditional tramping services.11  
 
It is questionable whether all these elements can be found in newer forms of maritime 
transport that are divergent from scheduled (liner) and non-scheduled (tramp) transport, as 
in the case of “specialised transport”, which has already been identified by the 
Commission in its decision regarding the Trans – Atlantic Agreement (hereinafter the TAA 
Decision).12 In the TAA Decision, the Commission identified a series of characteristics 
                                                 
8 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, OJ C 245, 26.9.2008, p. 2, para. 11. 
9 OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, p. 4. 
10 See Athanasiou, Lia I., Competition in liner and tramp maritime transport services: Uniform regulation, 
divergent application?, in Competition and Regulation in Shipping and Shipping Related Industries, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden – Boston, 2009, p.72. 
11 Ibid, p. 72. 
12 OJ L 376, 31.12.1994, p. 1. 
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specific to specialised transport, like the semi-regular nature, the large volumes of 
homogeneous goods and the use of specialised vessels developed specifically to respond to 
the customer’s needs,13 which render it distinct from liner services and tramp vessel 
services. Therefore, the “… the non-regularly scheduled…” criterion of the definition 
could be problematic in its interpretation and as a consequence a thorough analysis of the 
specific service is required before the Commission can determine whether it constitutes 
tramp vessel service within the meaning of the Regulation.14 
 
The “competitiveness” assumption (“…where the freight rates are freely negotiated case 
by case in accordance with the conditions of supply and demand.”) contained in the 
definition is open to different elucidations.15 First, it could be simply considered as an 
illustration of the reasoning behind the original exemption from the application of Reg. 
4056/86 to the tramp shipping sector.16 This alternative is supported also by the 4th Recital 
of Reg. 4056/86 which states: “…it appears preferable to exclude tramp vessel services 
from the scope of this Regulation, rates for these services being freely negotiated on a 
case-by-case basis in accordance with supply and demand conditions;”. The second option, 
closer to the principle of narrow interpretation of the exceptions to the EC rules and 
supported by the majority of the commentators,17 is to deem the “competitiveness” 
assumption as a condition for characterising a transport service as ‘tramp vessel service’ 
according to the definition of Reg. 4056/86. Therefore, not all tramp services fall within the 
definition. For example, such tramp services, where freight rates are not “freely negotiated” 
but predetermined based on an overall service agreement between shippers and tramp 
operators, should fall outside the definition of article 1(3)(a) of Reg. 4056/86.18  
 
                                                 
13 Ibid, paragraphs 47,48 and 49. 
14 European Commission, White Paper on the review of Regulation 4056/86, applying the EC competition 
rules to maritime transport, SEC (2004) 1254, Annex, Para 160, note 80. 
15 Blanco, L.O., Shipping Conferences under EC Antitrust Law, Criticism of a Legal Paradox, Hart 
Publishing, 2007, p. 170. 
16 Ersboll, N.S., The European Commission’s Enforcement Powers: An Analysis of the Exclusion of Tramp 
Vessel Services From Regulation 4056/86 and Regulation 1/2003 [2003] ECLR 375, 381-382. 
17 See Athanasiou, Lia I., op. cit., p.73, Ersboll, N.S., op.cit., 381-382, Ruttley, Ph., International Shipping 
and EEC Competition Law [1991] ECLR 9, and Blanco, L.O., op. cit., p.171. 
18 Ruttley, Ph., op. cit., p. 8-9.  
 7 
2.2 The definition of the relevant market 
 
In the following paragraphs, an attempt is being made firstly to identify the general features 
of the tramp shipping market, then to present the different segments of the sector, and 
finally to define the relevant market under competition law. The general characteristics of 
the tramp sector are not legally important under the new regime since there is no exclusion 
from the implementation of the EC competition rules. However, comprehension of those 
characteristics can be useful when defining the relevant market under competition law, as 
well as for the understanding of the structure and operation of the sector.19 The definition 
of the relevant product and geographic market is necessary when assessing a competition 
case. Its main purpose is to identify in a systematic way the competitive constraints faced 
by an undertaking.20 
 
2.2.1 General features of the tramp shipping sector 
 
A. Highly competitive market. 
As explained under 2.1, the reason, behind the long-standing exclusion of the tramp sector 
from the application of EC competition rules to it, was mainly the acceptance that the 
conditions of competition are inherent to the way the tramp market operates. Perfect 
competition is an economic model that describes a hypothetical market form in which no 
producer or consumer has power in the market to influence price. The theoretical model of 
competition is governed by the law of supply and demand.21 In order to affirm if the tramp 
market follows a nearly perfect competition model, as it is traditionally said, one has to 
examine whether the following four parameters are fulfilled: (i) atomicity, (ii) 
homogeneous product, (iii) transparency of information and (iv) equal access to the 
                                                 
19 Athanasiou, Lia I., op. cit., p. 75-76. 
20 European Commission, Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, p. 5. 
21 EU Report COMP/2006/D2/002 “Legal and Economic Analysis of Tramp Maritime Services”, prepared by 
Fearnley Consultants AS., 2007, para. 67. 
 8 
market.22 Failure to detect one of these four elements does not necessary imply a non-
competitive market. 
 
(i) Atomicity. Atomicity is the feature which describes the market that consists of a large 
number of small producers and customers, whose size is too small to influence the overall 
market. In the case of tramp market, producers are the shipowners/vessel operators and 
customers are the charterers.23 
 
Various studies have shown that numerous undertakings, none of which are in position 
with their actions to influence the prices offered, operate in the tramp sector. More 
specifically, the figures provided by the study prepared by Clarkson24 show that 4,795 
companies own 26,280 vessels of the world’s total merchant fleet, meaning an average of 5 
vessels each, hence ownership is indeed highly dispersed.  
 
Difficulties arise when trying to estimate the number of customers. Theoretically, there are 
several thousands potential customers if one bares in mind the parties involved in each 
transaction that requires transportation. For example, if the cargo is sold C&F (Cost and 
Freight), it is the seller, or his agent, who takes responsibility for the transportation. If, on 
the other hand, the cargo is sold FOB (Free On Board), responsibility for the transportation 
is on the buyer’s, or on his agent’s, part. Alternatively, an intermediary, a trader, might take 
care of the transportation, if the transaction is carried out through him. As a result, there are 
always at least three potential customers in each transaction.25 
 
Therefore, it could be safely assumed that the requirements of the element of “atomicity” 
are met in the tramp shipping market. 
 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., para 75. 
24 Clarkson Research Studies, The Tramp Shipping Market, April 2004, p.1. 
25 Fearnley’s Report, “Legal and Economic Analysis of Tramp Maritime Services”, op. cit., para 77. 
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(ii) Homogeneous product. Homogeneity means that goods and services are perfect 
substitutes; that is, there is no product differentiation.26 In the tramp sector, homogeneity of 
the product is understood in the sense that all undertakings supply ship space for transport 
purposes. Practically, this similarity in the provided services can be found only in sector 
segments and not in the tramp as a whole. This is a normal outcome of the continuous 
adaptation of the sector in order to respond to the customers’ needs. From a legal point of 
view, the notion of homogeneity is useful as part of the demand substitution test.27 
 
(iii) Transparency of information. Transparency of information means that the prices 
offered are easily available to competitors and clients. Information systems in the tramp 
sector are very open. Information about revenues and asset prices are published daily and 
widely circulated in the industry to both shipowners and charterers by a variety of 
sources.28 Thus, a high degree of transparency is ensured.29 
 
(iv) Equal access to the market. Despite the possible barriers, i.e. the need for assets, the 
required time, management issues and in some cases technological expertise,30 it is 
generally considered easy for a new player to enter the tramp market. More thorough 
consideration of this last parameter will be useful later when examining the criteria for 
definition of the relevant market under competition law, especially when looking at two of 
the main competitive constraints,31 namely ‘supply-side substitutability’ and ‘potential 
competition’. 
 
This brief analysis explained why the tramp shipping sector is traditionally described as 
highly competitive. In addition, it partly justified the reasoning behind the exclusion from 
                                                 
26 Ibid., para 82. 
27 Athanasiou, Lia I., op. cit., p.77. 
28 i.e. by shipbrokers or by the Baltic Exchange, which publishes daily reports covering over 64 individual 
routes for tankers, bulk carriers and gas carriers and produces, in addition, seven indices based on freight 
assessment. See, Fearnley’s Report, “Legal and Economic Analysis of Tramp Maritime Services”, op. cit., 
para 86. 
29 “The Tramp Shipping Market”, op. cit., p. 4. 
30 Fearnley’s Report, “Legal and Economic Analysis of Tramp Maritime Services”, op. cit., para. 121.  
31 “Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law”, op. cit., p. 3, 
para. 13. 
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implementing the EC competition provisions under the previous regime. Finally, the 
different issues presented here should be kept in mind when defining the relevant market 
from a competition law point of view. 
 
B. High degree of dependence on the trade patterns. 
The tramp sector displays a high degree of dependence, upstream and downstream, 
between suppliers and customers. This dependence is mainly reflected on the geographical 
movement of the vessels, the fluctuation in prices and the evolution of the sector through 
time. As it was the case for the first general feature discussed, examination and 
understanding of this feature will later be useful for the market delineation.   
 
Geographical movement of vessels and fluctuation in prices might be caused by a variety 
of reasons. For example, the production of some commodities, like agricultural32 or forest 
products33, which account for a significant percentage of the sea trade, is affected not only 
by seasonal or climatic elements but also by other external factors, like physical 
catastrophes. As a result, this volatility of the demand side causes the need for modification 
of the supply side; hence time is necessary for the tramp market to adjust. During the 
adjustment period, vessels may need to move regionally or to switch from the 
transportation of one commodity to another. Thus, the possible disequilibrium created 
affects temporarily the freight rates, i.e. when the supply of transport space exceeds the 
demand; freight rates drop (and vice versa). The impact on prices by the changes in the 
demand side will stop when the sector reaches equilibrium again. 
 
The above observation, that the tramp sector is vulnerable to trade alterations, leads to two 
valuable conclusions. Firstly, whilst defining the relevant market, it will not always be 
                                                 
32 This category of commodities includes products or raw materials of the agricultural industry, such as 
cereals, animal feedstuffs, sugar, molasses, refrigerated food, oil and fats and fertilizers, and accounts for 
13% of sea trade. See “The Tramp Shipping Market”, op. cit., p. 9. 
33 This category of commodities includes primarily industrial materials used for the manufacture of paper, 
paperboard and in the construction industry, such as timber (logs and lumber) wood pulp, plywood, paper and 
various wood products. See “The Tramp Shipping Market”, op. cit., p.9. 
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clear whether an increase in price may result in a switch in cargo flow. Secondly, the 
assessment of a prima facie restrictive agreement should take into account the fact that the 
supply side cannot by definition act without considering the possible reaction of the 
demand.34  
 
The dependence of the tramp sector to the demand side is also apparent from the evolution 
of the sector in time. In the post-War period, the world economy grew rapidly resulting in 
an increased demand of raw materials by the heavy industry. Under these conditions, the 
shipping industry had to adapt. This adaptation is mainly reflected in the size of the vessels. 
The last decades, vessels became significantly larger. For example, in the 1950s oil tankers 
had cargo capacity of less than 50,000 dwt. In the second half of the 1960s, the VLCC 
(Very Large Crude Carrier) had already emerged having a cargo capacity in excess of 
200,000 dwt. Similar development was noticed in the dry bulk carriers.35 This expansion in 
the vessels’ size has led to more cost effective vessels, and to a proportional decrease in the 
transport cost per tone with the increase in vessel size. Thus, allowing economies of scale 
to be achieved.36 
 
Apart from the general increase in vessels’ size, another aspect of the shipping industry’s 
efforts for adaptability to the client’s needs is the specialization of the tramp sector. For 
example, the carriage of paper and pulp required special handling because both of these 
products were sensitive to humidity and physical impact. This resulted in the development 
of OHBC ("open hatch, box shaped bulk carrier") vessels, which were specially designed 
based on the special characteristics of those products.37 That was also the case for other 
products and specialization was the sector’s response to the customers’ needs for safe, 
reliable and fast transport services. Furthermore, as it was already stated, under 2.1, 
                                                 
34 Athanasiou, Lia I., op. cit., p. 79. 
35 Fearnley’s Report, op. cit., p. 30, para. 143. 
36 Ibid., p. 30, paragraphs 141-142. 
37 Ibid., p. 31, para. 146. 
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specialization in the tramp market led to the recognition that the tramp market segments 
should be reviewed.38 
  
2.2.2 Tramp market segments 
 
Another element that should be taken into account, before proceeding to the market 
definition, is the division of the tramp sector in various subsectors. This rather brief 
presentation might be of use in the delineation of the geographical market (i.e. when 
examining the range of ports served) and especially when considering the substitutability of 
the vessels used. It has to be stressed though, that the different segments do not constitute 
relevant markets themselves.  
 
The tramp sector is traditionally divided into two main subsectors based on the nature of 
the cargo: the liquid bulk and the dry bulk. Recently, as already described above (under 
2.1), the Commission identified39 a third segment, known as "specialised transport" or often 
referred as “neo-bulk”. These subsectors are further divided into different segments. More 
particularly, in liquid bulk one can identify the following segments: i) chemical, ii) clean 
petroleum products (CPP), iii) crude oil, iv) dirty petroleum products (DPP), v) liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) and iv) liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Dry bulk sub-division is usually 
based on the vessel’s size (i.e. Capesize, Panamax etc.). Finally, neo-bulk sector is further 
separated by reference either to the type of the vessel (Ro-Ro, OHBC etc.) or to the 
transported cargo (motor vehicles, liquid gases etc.).40 
 
2.2.3 The relevant market under EC competition law 
 
Market definition usually serves as a prerequisite to the calculation of market shares, in the 
sense that it could convey meaningful information regarding market power for the purposes 
of assessing dominance (under article 82 EC) or for the purposes of assessing the effects on 
                                                 
38 See the TAA Decision, op. cit. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Fearnley’s Report, op. cit. 
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competition of an agreement (under article 81 EC).41 However, because of the complexity 
of the market definition process, there is always a risk of error. For instance, a broad 
definition would result to a lower standard of competition law obligations for an 
undertaking that has indeed significant market power. Hence, delineating the relevant 
market should be regarded a means to an end and not an end itself.42 In this section, an 
attempt is being made on how the general principles of market definition, as laid down in 
the Commission’s “Notice on the definition of relevant market” and in relevant case law, 
under the light of the recently issued “Guidelines of the application of Article 81EC Treaty 
to maritime transport services”, could apply to tramp transport services.  
 
The method that it will be followed is the traditional two-stage analysis. At first, the criteria 
used for the identification of the boundaries between the different product markets will be 
discussed, specifically (i) demand substitutability, (ii) supply substitutability and (iii) 
potential competition.43 Afterwards, the elements to be considered when defining the 
geographical market will be examined.  
 
A. Product market. 
 
(i) Demand substitutability.  
Demand-side substitution exists when purchasers of a product would switch to readily 
available substitutes or to suppliers located elsewhere in response to a small change in 
relative prices.44 Thus, there is mainly a question of a sufficient degree of 
interchangeability between products.45 Products that have different characteristics and not 
the same intended use should comprise distinct product markets. It should be noted here 
that, in our case, as product is considered the transport service provided by tramp vessels. 
                                                 
41 “Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law”, op. cit., p. 1, 
para. 2. 
42 Bellamy & Child, European Community Law of Competition, 6th ed., OUP, 2008, para. 4.001. 
43 “Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law”, op. cit., p. 3, 
para. 13. 
44 Ibid. p. 4, para. 17. 
45 See Case 85/76 Hoffmann - La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR-461, para 28. 
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For the determination of the relevant product market from the demand side, the European 
Commission sets as a starting point the “main terms” of an individual transport request. 
The Commission’s rationale behind this suggestion is that the “main terms” generally 
identify the essential elements of the transport requirement at issue. For example, voyage 
charter’s essential elements are the cargo to be carried, the cargo volume, the loading and 
discharging ports, the laydays or the ultimate date by which the cargo has to arrive and 
technical details regarding the vessel. Negotiability or non-negotiability of one of the main 
terms will qualify for a wider or narrower definition of the market respectively.46  
 
The Commission’s approach has been criticised.47 The core of the criticism is focused on 
the chosen methodology. It was commented that the starting point of the analysis is fixed 
too late, presupposing that the cargo owner has already decided on how he will ship the 
commodity to its destination. However, the research into substitutes normally takes place at 
an earlier stage, when the customer examines which the available transport services are. 
 
In my opinion, the chosen methodology, although the wording at this point is not clear, 
does not imply that the customer has already made his decision about the best way of 
shipping his cargo. The Guidelines refer to the “main terms” of an “individual transport 
request”. The word “request” indicates that the customer is indeed seeking for the best 
options among the available transport services. In that sense, the “main terms” reflect the 
customer’s needs. If, for instance, a cargo owner needs a certain type of vessel to ship his 
commodity but the vessel’s size is not significant for his choice, then the vessel’s size 
constitutes a negotiable element of the main terms. Thus, the relevant market is wider with 
respect to this specific element. Nevertheless, this is a point that requires clarification.  
 
Another element proposed by the Commission when examining demand substitutability is 
the consideration of the transport contracts types (i.e. voyage charters, time charters, 
                                                 
46 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 22. 
47 Athanasiou, Lia I., op. cit., p. 82-83. 
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contracts of affreightment etc.).48 The different types of contracts entail differentiated rights 
and obligations for the contracting parties. The choice of the contract type is primarily an 
entrepreneurial decision. The customers, on one hand, monitor rates under different 
contract types and shift their business accordingly. Shipowners, on the other hand, will try 
to fix their vessels in the most favourable terms possible, assuring stability and effective 
freight rates. It is questionable whether and to which extent the different transport contracts 
can in practice affect the nature of the service provided, and, thus, demand substitutability. 
In a recent decision49 (hereinafter the APMM/BROSTRØM Decision), the European 
Commission, when assessing the element of contract types for market definition purposes, 
found that there are no vessel availability issues when shifting business from one contract 
type to another. Moreover, the market investigation conducted by the Commission revealed 
that the majority of the operators uses at least three of the four possible contract types.50 
Therefore, there was no need for subdivision of the relevant market by contract types. 
However, consideration of the different transport contracts makes sense when examining 
the available capacity in certain tramp shipping markets. For example, vessels operating in 
more specialised trades tend to be fixed in longer term time charters.51 As a result, they can 
be considered as captive capacity and should not be taken into account when assessing the 
relevant market on a case by case basis.52 
 
Furthermore, the assessment of interchangeability between the different tramp vessel 
services requires an examination of the characteristics and the intended use of the ships. 
Thus, the types and sizes of the vessels, in connection to the nature of the commodity to be 
shipped, have to be considered. This requires obviously an ad hoc evaluation. 
                                                 
48 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 23. 
49 Commission Decision of 14/01/2009 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
(Case No COMP/M.5346 - APMM / BROSTRØM) according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 139/2004, p. 6, 
para. 34.  
50 There are mainly four contract types in the tanker business (which was of concern for the market 
investigation): voyage charters (VCs), time charters (TCs), contracts of affreightment (CoAs), and 
consecutive voyage charters (CVs). Ibid., p. 6, para. 33.  
51 Fearnley’s Report, op. cit., p. 39, para. 193.  
52 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 29. 
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Firstly, regarding the vessel types, it can be safely presumed that a liquid commodity for 
instance is not likely at all to be carried on dry bulk vessels; thus, there is no 
interchangeability between liquid bulk and dry bulk vessels. Things are not that simple in 
regards to some liquid cargoes that might be possible to be transported on different kinds of 
liquid bulk carriers. For example, crude oil, apart from being transported on crude oil 
tankers, is also transported on clean petroleum product tankers, combined carriers (which 
can carry ore, bauxite and crude oil) and on dirty petroleum product tankers.53 However, 
substitutability between liquid bulk vessels for the carriage of chemicals is more 
complicated, depending mainly on the level of hazard of the transported chemical. In 
addition, when defining the vessel type to be included in the relevant market, the double-
hull requirement for tankers in Community waters under Regulation 417/200254 shall be 
taken into account.55 
 
Secondly, as far as the vessel sizes is concerned, it appears to be the industry’s perception 
that vessel sizes constitute separate markets.56 This can partly be explained by the fact that 
generally larger vessels are able to offer more competitive freight rates due to economies of 
scale.57 Other reasons, for the market segmentation based on the size, are the flexibility of 
smaller vessels or the vessels’ different levels of ability to sail in adverse weather due to 
their size. The European Commission seems to concur with the industry’s view. The 
APMM/BROSTRØM investigation indicated that smaller vessels, on one hand, tend to be 
more flexible, because they can reach ports where there is low demand and ports with 
draught restrictions, and they allow customers to send small, regular shipments for just-in-
                                                 
53 Fearnley’s Report, op. cit., p. 294, para. 1272. 
54 Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 February 2002 on the 
accelerated phasing-in of double hull or equivalent design requirements for single hull oil tankers and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 2978/94, OJ L 64, 7.3.2002. 
55 See Commission Decision of 14/01/2009 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market (Case No COMP/M.5346 - APMM / BROSTRØM) according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 
139/2004, p. 3, para. 14. See also, European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC 
Treaty to maritime transport services”, op. cit., para. 30. 
56 See, Fearnley’s Report, op. cit. 
57 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 24. 
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time delivery, while large shipments require storage facilities. Larger vessels, on the other 
hand, are more fuel-efficient and cost-efficient (in terms of the cost of transport per ton of 
product, as loading one large cargo produces economies of scale). Finally, it appeared from 
the same investigation that smaller ships tend to focus on coastal/short-range trade, while 
larger ships tend to sail on long-haul routes. Moreover, most respondents to the market 
investigation consider that the 10,000 dwt limit is a generally accepted segmentation in the 
industry.58 For the above reasons, the Commission concluded that vessels of less than 
10,000 dwt belong to a separate relevant market from vessels within the 10,000-60,000 dwt 
range.  
 
Another element that the European Commission ses out for consideration in its Maritime 
Guidelines is the existence of chains of substitution between vessel sizes in tramp 
shipping.59 Vessel sizes at the extreme of certain tramp shipping markets are not directly 
substitutable but chain substitution effects may constrain pricing at the extremes, including 
those vessels in a broader market definition.60 Despite the inclusion of that element in the 
Maritime Guidelines under the factors to be considered for the determination of the 
relevant product market, the Commission, in the APMM/BROSTRØM Decision, deemed 
that the chains of substitution between different vessel sizes are closely related to the 
geographic market definition. Thus, it examined the possible existence of chain substitution 
effects under the relevant section.61  
 
To sum up, as it appears from the Maritime Guidelines and the APMM/BROSTRØM 
Decision, there is a variety of factors to be taken into account for the determination of  the 
                                                 
58 Commission Decision of 14/01/2009 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
(Case No COMP/M.5346 - APMM / BROSTRØM) according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 139/2004, p. 
5, para. 29. 
59 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 28. 
60 See, for example, Case M. 2706 Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess, OJ 2003 L248/1, where the 
Commission was examining cruise services, and it concluded that premium and economy cruises belong in 
the same relevant market because of chain substitution effects. 
61 Commission Decision of 14/01/2009 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
(Case No COMP/M.5346 - APMM / BROSTRØM) according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 139/2004, p. 
6, para. 32. 
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relevant product market from the demand side. In any event, it is necessary to assess 
demand substitutability on a case by case analysis because of the complexity of the sector 
and the wide range of the offered tramp vessel services.  
 
(ii) Supply substitutability. 
Supply-side substitutability exists where suppliers are able to switch production to the 
relevant products and market them in the short term without incurring significant additional 
costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes in relative prices. Then the 
market may be broadened to include the products that those suppliers are already 
producing.62 Supply-side substitution is an essential element for the definition of the 
product market,63 and it is meaningful when its results for the market definition are 
equivalent to those of the demand substitution research in terms of effectiveness and 
immediacy. Therefore, the examination of supply substitutability may affirm or even 
expand the market as already defined if it demonstrates that the suppliers could offer 
different services immediately and without important costs; hence time and cost are 
relevant for our assessment.  
  
The Maritime Guidelines set as a starting point for the determination of the relevant 
product market from the supply-side the technical and physical conditions of the cargo to 
be carried and the vessel type.64 For example, many oil tankers are able to carry dirty and 
clean petroleum products. Switching though from a dirty product to a clean product 
requires not only time but might also entail significant costs. The APMM/BROSTRØM 
investigation indicated that the cost of cleaning (including the opportunity cost of not being 
able to use the vessel, unless the cleaning takes place during a ballast voyage) is significant 
when compared to the price of a typical voyage.65 Apart from the cost and the necessary 
                                                 
62 “Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law”, op. cit., p. 5, 
para. 20. 
63 Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215. 
64 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 25. 
65 Commission Decision of 14/01/2009 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
(Case No COMP/M.5346 - APMM / BROSTRØM) according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 139/2004, p. 4, 
para. 17. 
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time, the investigation pointed out a number of other factors that tanker operators consider 
before cleaning a vessel in response to a customer's request. In particular, they estimate the 
prospects of profitability of the “clean” market for a significant period in the future, and 
whether it is possible to clean the vessel to the degree of cleanliness required by the 
customer or whether the cleaning can take place before the loading date required by the 
customer.66 However, the majority of the respondents to that investigation answered that 
the vessels transporting clean products are indeed substitutable with vessels transporting 
dirty products.67 Thus, the relevant market from the supply-side will comprise more than 
one type of vessel, if vessels can be adjusted to transport a particular cargo at negligible 
cost and in a short time-frame making it possible for different tramp service providers to 
compete for the transport of this cargo. 
 
Furthermore, it is stressed in the Maritime Guidelines68 the fact that the providers of 
specialised services might be at a competitive disadvantage for the transportation of other 
cargo because spesialised vessels are technically adapted to carry specific types of cargo. 
Finally, another element to be taken into account is the possible limitations (i.e. terminal 
and draught restrictions or environmental standards for particular vessel types in certain 
ports or regions) to the mobility of vessels, which could impede port calls in response to 
individual demand.69 
 
(iii) Potential competition. 
The third source of competitive constraint, potential competition, is not taken into account 
when defining markets.70 This analysis is only carried out at a later stage as part of the 
substantive competitive assessment if potential rival suppliers do not pose a sufficiently 
close competitive constraint to be treated as part of the relevant market through supply-side 
                                                 
66 Ibid., p. 4, para. 18. 
67 Ibid., p. 4, para. 20. 
68 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 26. 
69 Ibid., para. 27. 
70 “Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law”, op. cit., p. 6, 
para. 24. 
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substitution.71 Supply-side substitution and potential competition are conceptually different 
issues but there is ‘overlap in part’ since both of them represent an effective competitive 
constraint related to the conditions of entry in the short-term and in the long-term 
respectively.72 Because of that close relation to supply-side substitution dimension of the 
product market, potential competition, i.e. the potential barriers to entry in the tramp 
shipping market, will be discussed at this point.  
 
The possible barriers, which a new player might face to entry the tramp market, are: a) 
capital, b) time, c) management and d) technological.73 
 
a) Capital barriers: Despite the large assets required for the acquisition of a ship, the active 
financing market effectively mitigates the capital cost barrier to entry in the tramp market. 
There are various financial institutions that are engaged in the financing of shipping 
companies, such as commercial banks, export credit agencies, investments banks, private 
equity houses and finance lessors.74 
 
b) Time barriers: There are two possible ways to enter the shipping market, either by 
ordering a shipyard to build a vessel or by seeking the desired vessel type in the second 
hand market. The first option might delay the entrance for several years. However, a more 
immediate entrance in the tramp market can be achieved by following the second option 
since the second hand market for buying ships is generally active. Therefore, time barriers 
are generally easy to be overcome. 
 
c) Management barriers: Becoming a major player requires a lot more than simply buying a 
ship. Usually, one needs further organization to operate in more industrialized market 
segments, for example IT systems, human resources, customer relations etc.75 These days, 
management barriers are not that essential, as investors can operate as pure tonnage 
                                                 
71 Bellamy & Child, op. cit., p. 271, para. 4.054. 
72 Case T-191/98 Atlantic Container Line v Commission [2003] ECR II-3275. 
73 Fearnley’s Report, op. cit., p. 27, para. 121. 
74 Ibid., p. 60, para. 283. 
75 Ibid., p. 28, para. 128. 
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providers to the major shipping companies in the various segments without having any 
organization or special systems.76 
 
d) Technological barriers: Finally, “know-how” is necessary when an investor wishes to get 
involved in more sophisticated sectors like the chemical segment, but once again these 
barriers are significantly mitigated by the way the tramp sector operates. 
 
 
B. Geographic market. 
 
According to the European Commission’s Notice of relevant market, the relevant 
geographic market “comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved 
in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition 
are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas 
because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those area”.77 The 
procedure for the determination of the geographic market is again based on an analysis of 
the demand characteristics,78 and further, if necessary, of the supply factors.79  
 
A proposed starting point in the Maritime Guidelines is to consider the geographic 
elements that are usually contained in the transport requirements, i.e. the loading and 
discharging ports or regions. These ports can provide a first orientation for the delineation 
of the relevant geographic market from the demand-side, but without any prejudice to the 
final definition of the relevant geographic market,80 because other vessels, which operate in 
different areas, may easily shift their business if the freight rates make it economical for 
them to do so.  
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 “Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law”, op. cit., p. 2, 
para. 8. 
78 Ibid., p. 7, para. 29. 
79 Ibid., p. 7, para. 30. 
80 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 31. 
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In the APMM/BROSTRØM investigation, the notifying party submitted that in tanker 
business the geographic scope of the market is worldwide. Its analysis was based on 
allegedly high correlation rates between spot prices on routes in different regions. 
Alternatively, the notifying party proposed a distinction between tankers trading “West of 
Suez” and tankers trading “East of Suez”.81 In addition, the market investigation showed 
that in the event of a 5-10% increase in price in a neighbouring area, a quarter of the 
respondents would not move their vessels there, while another quarter would, and around a 
half replied “only on certain conditions”.82 Unfortunately, the Commission did not reach 
any conclusion regarding the relevant geographic market, as there were no competition 
concerns on any possible market definition.83 As a result, it is not clear at the present 
moment which criteria will be of significance for the Commission when determining the 
relevant geographic market for the purposes of a competition case related to the tramp 
sector. However, it could be safely assumed from the notifying party’s submissions and the 
conducted market investigation that the tramp shipping sector is an open market 
characterised generally by geographical substitutability.     
 
Finally, it is noted in the Maritime Guidelines84 that certain geographic markets may be 
defined on a directional basis or may occur only temporarily because, for example, climatic 
conditions or harvest periods periodically affect the demand for transport of particular 
cargos. In this context, repositioning of vessels, ballast voyages and trade imbalances 
should be considered for the delineation of relevant geographic markets. 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Commission Decision of 14/01/2009 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market 
(Case No COMP/M.5346 - APMM / BROSTRØM) according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 139/2004, p. 7, 
para. 36. 
82 Ibid., p. 7, para. 37. 
83 Ibid., p. 7, para. 39. 
84 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 32. 
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3. HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS IN THE TRAMP SHIPPING SECTOR UNDER 
ARTICLE 81 EC. 
 
3.1 Pool agreements in tramp shipping. 
 
According to the information provided by the Maritime Guidelines85 and other studies,86 
the principal form of horizontal cooperation between carriers in the tramp sector is the 
shipping pool. A shipping pool is a collection of similar vessel types under various 
ownerships, placed under the care of an administration. This administration markets the 
vessels as a single, cohesive fleet unit and collects – ‘pools’ – their earnings, which, in due 
course, are distributed to individual owners under a pre-arranged ‘weighing’ system, by 
which each entered vessel should receive its fair share.87 The reasons for creating a 
shipping pool and their common features will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Pool agreements are a form of commercial cooperation between shipowners aiming 
primarily at a more efficient fleet deployment and spread of the risks. For example, 
compliance with the time and cargo volume restrictions of a contract of affreightment 
(CoA) might require capacity (physical or managerial) that small to medium-sized 
shipowners or operators do not have in order to bid for such business alone or, if they do, 
they may feel that the risks involved may be higher than what they would normally be 
prepared to accept.88 Thus, an obvious commercial solution would be the establishment of a 
pool with other shipowners or operators with similar vessels because a bigger fleet can 
react quicker and more effectively to the market’s demand, achieving the required capacity 
to be able to spread its services among CoAs and subsequent voyage charters in a more 
                                                 
85 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, OJ C 245, 26.9.2008, p. 2, para. 60. 
86 See EU Report COMP/2006/D2/002 “Legal and Economic Analysis of Tramp Maritime Services”, 
prepared by Fearnley Consultants AS., 2007. 
87 Definition of shipping pools as given by Packard, W.V., Shipping Pools 2nd ed., Lloyd’s of London Press 
Ltd, 1995, p. 3. 
88 Haralambides, H.E., The economics of bulk shipping pools, extract from Maritime Policy & Management, 
23(3): 221-237, 1996, p. 225. 
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coordinated and hence cost effective and efficient manner.89 In this way, ballast legs will be 
minimized, and as a result higher rate of utilization of each vessel will secure stable 
incomes for the pool members. Furthermore, achievement of a strong marketing position, 
high image and better financing possibilities have been indicated, among others, as 
incentives for creating a pool.90 
 
Shipping pools are formed by individually negotiated contracts, the pooling agreements, 
which often incorporate a master charterparty (normally a time charter form of common 
use).91 There is no universal model for a pool but a variety of different pooling structures 
exist. It is however possible to identify a number of similar features between the different 
pooling agreements. These common characteristics can be categorised92 as follows: 
 
(i) Similar tonnage: As it was explained above, one of the main reasons for creating a pool 
is to attract large contracts of affreightment. Thus, the appropriate solution is to pool 
together the same or similar vessel types in order the pool to be able to offer full flexibility 
and to be able to substitute vessels where and when it is necessary. As a result, pools are 
usually specialised in certain product markets. In addition, similar tonnage facilitates the 
distribution of revenues and voyage costs between the vessels. 
 
(ii) Central administration and joint marketing: In the majority of the pools, a Pool 
Management Company (hereinafter PMC) markets the fleet as a single, cohesive entity, 
offering in that way transport solutions regardless of whose ship performs the actual 
voyage. The PMC, which can be either a separate company (administration controlled 
pools) or one of the pool members (member-controlled pools),93 is responsible for the 
                                                 
89 Lorenzon, F., and Nazzini, R., Setting Sail on a Sea of Doubt: Tramp Shipping Pools, Competition Law 
and the Noble Quest for Certainty, in Competition and Regulation in Shipping and Shipping Related 
Industries, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden – Boston, 2009, p. 96. 
90 Haralambides, H.E., op. cit., p. 224. 
91 Lorenzon, F., and Nazzini, R., op. cit., p. 97. 
92 The categorisation is based on Haralambides, H.E., op.cit., p. 221 et seq, and on Fearnley’s Report, op. cit., 
p. 245 et seq.   
93 This distinction was originally proposed by Packard, W.V., op. cit., p. 6, and was followed by 
Haralambides, H.E., op. cit., p. 222. 
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commercial management (i.e. joint marketing and negotiation of freight rates)94 and 
commercial operation (for example, planning vessel movements and instructing vessels, 
nominating agents in ports etc)95 of the pool. Ship financing matters, manning and the 
technical management of the vessels lie at the shipowners’ part. Another important task 
that the PMC performs, apart from marketing the vessels, is to collect the freights and 
distribute the revenues.   
 (iii) Negotiation of freight or charter rates: The PMC, acting on behalf of the shipowners 
and in conformity with the shipowners’ agreed operating instructions for the pool, is 
responsible for negotiating the freight rates and fixing the vessels on agreed terms and 
conditions. This feature enhances the view of the pool as a single entity. 
 
 (iv) Centralisation of incomes and voyage costs: The PMC will usually collect the freights 
and will eventually distribute the net result to the members of the pool, after deducting its 
commission and all voyage costs incurred. The allocation of the revenues is being carried 
out according to a complex weighing system integrated in the pool agreement. 
 
Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of pool agreements under the light of the EC 
competition law rules, it is useful to mention at this point some features of these 
agreements that are of significance from a competition law point of view. First, the fact that 
pool agreements’ key feature is the joint marketing and chartering out of the participants’ 
vessels. Secondly, any possible non-compete clauses96 prohibiting pool members from 
being active in the same market outside the pool. Thirdly, the notice periods contained in 
the exit clauses, which regulate the right of the participants to withdraw their vessels.97 
Fourthly, provisions of the agreements related to the lay-up of vessels.98 Finally, clauses 
regarding the exchange of sensitive technological and commercial information.  
                                                 
94 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 61. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Røsæg, Erik, Organisational Maritime Law, 1993, p. 99. 
97 Packard, W.V., op. cit., p. 122. 
98 Ibid., p. 113. 
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3.2 Assessment of pool agreements under Article 81(1) EC. 
 
In the following paragraphs, tramp shipping pools under Article 81(1) EC will be 
examined. The assessment will mainly take into consideration the Maritime Guidelines, the 
Commission’s “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements”99 (hereinafter the Horizontal Guidelines) and relevant case law. 
 
3.2.1 Pool agreements that do not fall under Article 81(1) EC. 
 
There are certain types of pool agreements that by their very nature do not infringe Article 
81(1) EC. The European Commission, being in line with the Horizontal Guidelines,100 
states in its Maritime Guidelines101 that if the participants to a pool are not actual or 
potential competitors, then this pool agreement does not fall under the prohibition of 
Article 81(1) EC. Such a situation is unlikely to be met in the majority of the pools. As 
presented under 3.1, for reasons of efficiency, pools usually have fleet consisting of vessels 
of similar type and size, and consequently the owners of the vessels can be deemed to 
operate in the same product market. 
 
It might be the case however that the undertakings participating in a pool are not able to 
provide the services covered by the pool independently. For example, when two or more 
shipowners set up a shipping pool for the purpose of tendering for and performing contracts 
of affreightment for which as individual operators they could not bid successfully or which 
they could not carry on their own.102 Therefore, a pool agreement concluded on these 
grounds will not infringe Article 81(1) EC,103 even if such pools occasionally carry other 
                                                 
99 European Commission, “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements”, OJ C 3, 6.1.2001, p. 2. 
100 Ibid., para. 24. 
101 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 64. 
102 Ibid. 
103 European Commission, “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements”, op. cit., para. 24.  
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cargo representing a small part of the overall volume.104 In practice, cases where a 
shipowner would not be able to operate his vessels without participating in a pool are rare. 
Membership of a pool is not usually a necessity but a vehicle for the owners to achieve 
greater efficiency and to minimise commercial risks. Nonetheless, agreements involving 
small shipowners, who need to obtain finance on the commercial market and are required 
by their banks or whoever is financing their vessels to enter into pools,105 might qualify as 
pool agreements that by their nature will fall outside Article 81(1) EC.   
 
Finally, pools are not caught by Article 81(1) EC if their activity does not influence the 
relevant parameters of competition106 because they are of minor importance107 and/or do 
not appreciably affect trade between Member States.108 This follows from the application 
of the de minimis doctrine which was first formulated by the ECJ in the Volk v 
Vervaecke109 case. The de minimis doctrine, using a series of quantitative criteria, basically 
reflects the acknowledgment that undertakings with market share below certain thresholds 
or small and medium-sized undertakings are rarely capable of appreciably affect trade 
between Member States.110 That being said, it could be considered as a ‘safe harbour’111 for 
agreements below certain thresholds.112 However in some circumstances an agreement 
might be still held to fall within Article 81(1) EC113 even if it is below the quantitative 
standards as set out by the Commission in its “Notice on agreements of minor importance” 
                                                 
104 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 64. 
105 Fearnley’s Report, op. cit., p. 331. 
106 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 65, and European Commission, “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements”, op. cit., para. 24. 
107 European Commission, “Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty”, OJ C 368, 22.12.2001, p. 13. 
108 European Commission, “Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
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110 European Commission, “Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty”, op. cit., paragraphs 2 and 3. 
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112 European Commission, “Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty”, op. cit., para. 7. 
113 See, for example, Case 19/77, Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission [1978] ECR 131, 
where Miller’s market share was assessed around 5% but nevertheless the agreement was found to infringe 
Article 81(1) EC. 
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(hereinafter the De Minimis Notice); and reversely, an agreement may be found not to have 
an appreciable effect on competition even where the thresholds in the De Minimis Notice 
are exceeded. Moreover, the de minimis doctrine does not provide a “safe harbour” for 
agreements containing any of the hardcore restrictions,114 namely (i) the fixing of prices 
when selling the products to third parties,115 (ii) the limitation of output or sales, and (iii) 
the allocation of markets or customers.116 Therefore, in the case of tramp shipping pools the 
de minimis doctrine is unlikely to apply, despite the fact that many of the pool 
agreements117 do not represent significant market shares, because joint marketing of the 
vessels entails joint determination of the freight rates.  
  
 
3.2.2 Pool agreements that generally fall under Article 81(1) EC. 
 
Pool agreements between competitors that have the object to restrict competition by means 
of price fixing, output limitations or sharing of markets or customers are generally 
presumed to fall under Article 81(1) EC.118 The European Commission identifies a type of 
agreements, the commercialisation agreements between competitors, that will almost 
always be caught by the prohibition of Article 81(1) EC.119 These are defined as 
agreements involving “cooperation between competitors in the selling, distribution or 
promotion of their products”.120 The principal competition concern about a 
                                                 
114 European Commission, “Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty”, op. cit., para. 11. 
115 See, for example, Greek Ferry Services Cartel OJ L 109/24 [1999], where the Commission imposed fines 
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“hardcore”.  
117 According to the findings of Fearnley’s Report, op. cit. 
118 European Commission, “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements”, op. cit., para. 25. 
119 Ibid., para. 144. 
120 Ibid., para. 139. 
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commercialisation agreement between competitors is price fixing, which is inherent to joint 
selling, since, according to the Horizontal Guidelines, joint selling comprises the “joint 
determination of all commercial aspects related to the sale of the product including 
price”.121 Thus, in the case of tramp shipping pools, one has to examine if they are limited 
to joint selling in order to count as commercialisation agreements that almost always fall 
under Article 81(1) EC. 
 
At this point, it is important to stress that not all agreements involving joint selling features 
are caught by Article 81(1) EC. The European Commission acknowledges that production 
joint ventures should be treated differently because “It is inherent to the functioning of such 
a joint venture that decisions on output are taken jointly by the parties. If the joint venture 
also markets the jointly manufactured goods, then decisions on prices need to be taken 
jointly by the parties to such an agreement. In this case, the inclusion of provisions on 
prices or output does not automatically cause the agreement to fall under Article 81(1). 
The provisions on prices or output will have to be assessed together with the other effects 
of the joint venture on the market to determine the applicability of Article 81(1)”.122 
Therefore, Article 81(1) EC is not always to be applied to a production joint venture that 
also performs the distribution of the manufactured products and sets the sales prices for 
these products, provided that the price fixing by the joint venture is the effect of integrating 
the various functions.123 That being said, it is critical from a competition law point of view 
to examine whether and to which extent tramp shipping pools could be deemed to 
encompass characteristics of a production joint venture.  
 
The Horizontal Guidelines are not clear on how the concept of joint production should be 
construed when it comes to the provision of services. It is stated however, that they apply 
to agreements concerning both goods and services, collectively referred to as ‘products’;124 
hence, it can be assumed that the guidance regarding joint production can apply mutatis 
                                                 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid., footnote 18. 
123 Ibid., para. 90. 
124 Ibid., para. 13. 
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mutandis to arrangements between service providers for the joint provision of services. 
Pooled tramp vessel services will be considered to involve joint production elements if it 
can be found some integration of the means of provision of the services separately from 
their joint commercialisation or marketing.  
 
The situation in the standard shipping pools (as they were presented under 3.1) could be, in 
an analogy with the production and sale of goods, described as follows. The pooled vessels 
could be considered as an input made by the shipowners for the production of an integrated 
set of transport services provided to each customer. Thus, the pooled vessels are in that way 
similar to what raw materials are for the manufacture of goods. The pool manager, 
responsible for the commercial management and operation of the pooled vessels, has those 
joint functions integrated under his control, in the same way as production and sale of 
goods might be integrated in a single factory.125 Therefore, following obviously a rather 
simplified approach, it could be assumed that generally, in standard shipping pools, joint 
selling is coupled with features of joint production. The European Commission, aware of 
this fact, sets it for consideration in its Maritime Guidelines.126  
 
In any event, given the variation in pools’ characteristics, each pool must be analysed on a 
case by case basis. How each tramp pool agreement will be finally treated under EC 
competition rules depends on where its centre of gravity lies. For the determination of the 
centre of gravity, two factors should be taken into account: first, the starting point of the 
cooperation, and, secondly, the degree of integration of the different functions which are 
being combined.127 Therefore, if the centre of gravity of a pool agreement is joint selling, it 
will count as a commercialisation agreement, and consequently it will almost always fall 
within the prohibition of Article 81(1) EC. If, on the other hand, the centre of gravity is 
joint production, then any price fixing arrangement will not be assessed separately, but the 
overall effects of the production joint venture on the market must be considered in order to 
                                                 
125 Fearnley’s Report, op. cit., para 1513. 
126 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 62. 
127 European Commission, “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements”, op. cit., para. 12. 
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determine the applicability of Article 81(1) EC.  
 
It should be noted here that a production agreement with integrated distribution will often 
in fact account for a full-function joint venture.128 This will be the case for tramp shipping 
pools, which are created as a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of 
an autonomous economic entity and meets the thresholds set by Council Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004 (the EC Merger Regulation).129 To the extent that the creation of such pools 
has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of their parents, the 
coordination shall be appraised in accordance with the criteria of Article 81(1) and (3) EC 
with a view to establishing whether or not the operation is compatible with the common 
market.130 
 
3.2.3 Pool agreements that may fall under Article 81(1) EC. 
 
Pool agreements, which do not belong in any of the abovementioned categories, need 
further analysis in order to conclude whether they fall within the scope of the Article 81(1) 
EC prohibition. In the following paragraphs, different factors, on which pool’s ability to 
cause negative effects on competition depends, will be discussed.  
 
A. Economic context and market’s structural factors. 
 
If a pool does not have as its object a restriction of competition, then its effects in the 
market shall be appraised.131 For a pool agreement to be restrictive by effect, it must affect 
actual or potential competition132 to such an extent that on the relevant market negative 
                                                 
128 Ibid., footnote 41. 
129 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 24, 
29.1.2004, p.1. 
130 Ibid., Article 2(4), and European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to 
maritime transport services”, op. cit., para. 63. 
131 Ibid., para. 67. 
132 See Case C-7/95 P, John Deere Ltd v Commission, [1998] ECR I-3111, para. 77, where it is stated that 
Article 81(1) “does not restrict such an assessment to actual effects alone; it must also take account of the 
agreement's potential effects on competition within the common market”. 
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effects on prices, costs, innovation, service differentiation and service quality can be 
expected with a reasonable degree of probability.133 The negative effects must be 
appreciable; otherwise the prohibition rule of Article 81(1) does not apply.134 Pools can 
have these effects by appreciably reducing rivalry between the parties to the pool 
agreement or between them and third parties.135  
 
A pool’s capacity to cause such appreciable negative effects depends on the economic 
context. The analysis of the economic context is necessary in order to determine the 
competition which would have occurred in the absence of the pool agreement in dispute.136 
The correct determination of what the position would be without the pool agreement in 
question is critical to a proper assessment of the effect of the agreement. Such an analysis 
should take into account the pool members’ combined power,137 and to which extent the 
members’ behaviour in neighbouring markets, which are closely related to the market 
directly affected by the cooperation, might be influenced.138 The European Commission in 
its Maritime Guidelines gives as an example the case where the pool’s market is that for the 
transport of forest products in specialized box shaped vessels (market A) and the pool’s 
members also operate ships in the dry bulk market (market B). Here, it should be examined 
what would be the position of the pool members in those markets in the absence of the pool 
agreement.   
                                                 
133 See Case T-112/99, Métropole télévision (M6) and others v Commission [2001] ECR II-2459, para. 76, 
where the Court states that “it is not necessary to hold, wholly abstractly and without drawing any distinction, 
that any agreement restricting the freedom of action of one or more of the parties is necessarily caught by the 
prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) of the Treaty. In assessing the applicability of Article 81(1) to an 
agreement, account should be taken of the actual conditions in which it functions, in particular the economic 
context in which the undertakings operate, the products or services covered by the agreement and the actual 
structure of the market concerned”. 
134 See Case 5/69, Franz Völk v S.P.R.L. Ets J. Vervaecke, op. cit., para. 7, where the Court states that “an 
agreement falls outside the prohibition in Article 81 when it has only an insignificant effect on the markets”. 
135 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty”, OJ C 101, 
27.4.2004, p.97, para. 16. 
136  See Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH [1966] ECR 235, where the 
Court states that “The competition in question must be understood within the actual context in which it would 
occur in the absence of the agreement in dispute”. 
137 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 69. 
138 European Commission, “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements”, op. cit., para. 142. 
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Furthermore, the grade of impact that a pool may have on the relevant market is highly 
related to a number of structural factors of the market where the specific pool operates.139 
For example, multi-membership (a pool shares members with other pools) in pools may 
raise coordination concerns.140 More specifically, a member in two or more pools, 
operating in the same or related markets, will be able to coordinate its behaviour in such a 
way that those pools’ conduct will be influenced and coordinated to its own interests. 
Therefore, it is important to examine if the participant shipowners in a shipping pool are 
also members in other pools because this fact may obviously has restrictive effects on 
competition. In that case, the assessment of the pool’s market power should take in 
consideration the market shares of any other pool with which it has a common member in 
order to reach more realistic results.  
 
Other structural factors in the relevant market to be taken into account when assessing a 
pool’s ability to cause appreciable negative market effects are:141 the market concentration, 
the position and number of competitors, the stability of market shares over time, market 
entry barriers and the likelihood of entry (see 2.2.3.A (iii) potential competition, where an 
account of the possible barriers to entry the tramp shipping market was provided), market 
transparency (see 2.2.1.A), countervailing buying power of transport users (see 2.2.1.B, 
where it was stressed that the tramp shipping market is in large extent demand-driven) and 
the nature of the services (i.e. homogeneous versus differentiated services). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
139 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 70. 
140 See Commission Decision of 14 July 1986 in Case IV/30.320 - Optical Fibres, OJ L 236/30, 22.8.1986, 
para. 45, where the Commission recognises that “The restrictions and distortions of competition resulting 
from the agreements arise from the parallel existence of functionally similar joint ventures in which [a 
member] participates actively.”  
141 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 70. 
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B. Nature of the pool agreement. 
 
Apart from the relevant market’s structural factors, consideration should be given to the 
nature of the agreement for the evaluation of a tramp shipping pool’s effect on 
competition.142 There are different features in a pool agreement that might raise 
competition law concerns, i.e. (i) non-compete clauses, (ii) lock-in periods and exit clauses, 
and (iii) the exchange of commercially sensitive information.  
 
(i) Non-compete clauses: The majority of pool agreements usually contain some kind of 
non-compete clauses.143 Although the exact wording among the different agreements 
varies, the common denominator is a clear restriction on the pool members from engaging 
vessels of the same type, as those committed to the pool, in the same market as the pool. In 
order to determine whether or not such clauses come within the prohibition of Article 81(1) 
EC, it is necessary to examine what would be the state of competition if those clauses did 
not exist.144 The rationale behind the incorporation of a non-compete clause in a pool 
agreement is merely the fact that the members can acquire knowledge, which could be used 
to the detriment of the purpose of the agreement. Nevertheless, the duration and scope of 
such clauses must be strictly limited to the attainment of that purpose, otherwise they 
cannot be held as having a beneficial effect on competition.145  
 
(ii) Lock-in periods and exit clauses: In addition, pool agreements usually include clauses 
related to lock-in periods and notice periods. Lock-in period is called the predetermined 
amount of time during which a member is not allowed to leave the pool. Notice periods are 
contained in the exit clauses and regulate the right of the participants to withdraw their 
vessels. Contractual restrictions related to the participant’s right to withdraw from the pool 
raise concerns for possible negative effects on potential competition. An undertaking’s 
obligation to stay in the pool for a certain period of time might constitute an effective 
                                                 
142 Ibid., para. 71. 
143 According to the findings of Fearnley’s Report, op. cit. 
144 See, Case 42/84, Remia BV and others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, para. 18. 
145 Ibid., para. 20. 
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competitive constraint for them to move their pooled vessels to a better market. Therefore, 
as it is the case for the non-compete clauses, lock-in periods and notice periods should be 
regulated in such a way that their duration is not likely to cause negative effects on 
competition. 
 
(iii) The exchange of commercially sensitive information: The existence of a tramp 
shipping pool can obviously facilitate the exchange of information between its members. 
The exchange of information is likely to be caught by the prohibition of Article 81(1) EC if 
it comprises commercially sensitive data relating to the parameters of competition, such as 
price, capacity or costs.146 The appraisal of information as commercially sensitive should 
take into account a number of criteria. Firstly, information published in the public domain 
does not in principle constitute an infringement of Article 81(1) EC.147 Higher accessibility 
to the data improves the level of market transparency. However, publicly available 
information combined with other information may result to commercially sensitive 
information, whose exchange is potentially restrictive of competition.148 Secondly, the 
exchange of individual or aggregated information, which enables the identification of 
individual undertakings, is also possible to infringe Article 81(1) EC.149 Thirdly, the age of 
the data exchanged is also an important factor. Information, which was more than year old, 
has been considered historic150 whereas information less than one year old has been viewed 
as recent.151 The exchange of future data is particularly likely to be problematic, especially 
                                                 
146 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 50. 
147 See Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v Commission [2003] 
ECR II-3275, para. 1154. See also Case C-7/95 P, John Deere Ltd v Commission, op. cit., paragraphs 89,90.  
148 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 51. 
149 See Commission Decision of 23 December 1977 in Case IV/29.176 – Vegetable Parchment, OJ L 70/54, 
13.3.1978 for the exchange of individual information. See also Case 40-48/73, "Suiker Unie" UA and others v 
Commission [1975] ECR-1663 for the exchange of aggregated information. 
150 See Commission Decision of 17 February 1992 in Case IV/36.370 – UK Agricultural Tractor Registration 
Exchange, OJ L 68/19, 13.3.1992, para. 50, where the Commission considers “that an annual exchange of 
one-year-old sales figures of individual competitors […] can be accepted as commercial data with no 
appreciable distorting effect on competition between the manufacturers or between the dealers operating on 
[…] market”. 
151 See Commission Decision of 26 November 1997 in Case IV/36.069 - Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl, OJ L 
1/10, 3.1.1998, para. 17.  
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when it relates to prices or output, because it may reveal the commercial strategy an 
undertaking intends to adopt in the market.152 In that case, it may appreciably reduce 
rivalry between the parties to the exchange and is thus potentially restrictive of 
competition. Finally, the more frequent the information is exchanged, the more swiftly 
competitors can react. This facilitates retaliation and ultimately lowers the incentives to 
initiate competitive actions on the market; as a consequence the so-called ‘hidden 
competition’ could be restricted.153 
 
It is useful to be noted at this point that one should consider ‘commercial ancillarity’ when 
assessing contractual restrictions contained in a pool agreement. ‘Commercial ancillarity’ 
reflects the acknowledgement that some restrictive provisions of an agreement might be 
necessary in order to enable the parties to achieve a legitimate commercial purpose,154 i.e. 
the penetration of a new market,155 the sale of a business156 or the successful establishment 
of a group purchasing association.157  Therefore, if it is successfully proved that a 
restrictive clause is ancillary to a legitimate commercial operation, then the agreement will 
fall outside Article 81(1) EC. In the case of tramp shipping pools, ancillarity is unlikely to 
be found between any contractual restrictions and the pool agreement since joint selling of 
transport services, which is the main function of tramp pools, does not qualify as a 
legitimate commercial purpose.158 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
152 See Case C-199/92 P, Hüls AG v Commission [1999] ECR I- I-4287, paragraphs 141 et. seq.  
153 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 55. 
154 Whish, op. cit. p.126. 
155 Ibid. 
156 See Case 42/84, Remia BV and others v Commission [1985] ECR-2545. 
157 See Case C-250/92, Gøttrup-Klim Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab AmbA [1994] 
ECR I-5641. 
158 European Commission, “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements”, op. cit., para. 144. 
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C. Joint purchasing. 
 
Some tramp shipping pools do not involve joint selling but nevertheless entail some degree 
of coordination on the parameters of competition, e.g. joint purchasing.159 As element of 
joint purchasing in pools can be regarded the PMC’s responsibility for payment of the 
voyage related costs (bunker costs, port charges etc.). The reasons for the centralization of 
purchasing are related to cost efficiencies due to the pool’s increased bargaining power.  
An agreement on joint purchasing does not by its nature fall within Article 81(1) EC.160 
However, joint buying may have restrictive effects on the relevant purchasing market, and 
on the downstream selling market where the participants in the agreement are active as 
sellers.161 Regarding the relevant purchasing market, significant buying power by a group 
of customers may lead the suppliers of that market to recover the price reductions for one 
group by increasing their prices for other customers and/or by reducing quality and 
lessening innovation efforts.162 In addition, increased buying power may foreclose 
competing buyers by limiting their access to efficient suppliers.163 In the case of the 
downstream selling market, a joint purchasing agreement is deemed to have anti-
competitive effects if cost savings do not pass on to consumers but the agreement is 
primarily used as a vehicle for the parties to use their combined power for coordinating 
their behaviour as sellers.164 In order for the abovementioned negative market effects to 
take place, it is necessary the parties to the agreement to have some significant degree of 
market power.165 Practically, this is very unlikely to be the case for the tramp shipping 
pools since fuels or port services for instance are products required by the entire shipping 
industry. 
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3.3 Applicability of Article 81(3) EC. 
 
A pool agreement that is found to infringe Article 81(1) EC is not necessarily unlawful. It 
can be exempted from the Article 81(1) prohibition if it satisfies all166 the four conditions 
laid down in Article 81(3) EC. These four cumulative conditions are: 
 
i) the arrangement concerned must contribute to improving the production or distribution of 
the goods or services in question, or to promoting technical or economic progress; 
ii) consumers must be allowed a fair share of the resulting benefit; 
iii) the agreement must not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are 
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
iv) and finally, it must not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
 
It is important to be stressed that there are no anti-competitive agreements which could 
never satisfy the above conditions;167 as a consequence, there are no agreements that are 
‘per se’ illegal in the EC system.168 Even agreements restricting competition by object are 
capable of fulfilling the four cumulative conditions.169 However, the greater the restriction 
of competition found under Article 81(1) EC, the greater the efficiencies and the pass-on to 
consumers must be. In any event, it is upon the undertakings defending the agreement the 
                                                 
166 It has been repeatedly stressed by the Community Courts that an agreement must fulfills all four of the 
conditions in order to benefit from 81(1) EC. See for example Joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VVVB 
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are satisfied and the practice in question has been properly notified to the Commission”, see also Joined 
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Aeree Italiane SpA, OJ L 362/17, 09/12/2004, where the Commission granted an individual exemption to an 
agreement being restrictive of competition by object. 
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burden of proving that the arrangement in question satisfies Article 81(3) EC.170 Moreover, 
after the implementation of Council Regulation 1/2003 (‘the Modernisation 
Regulation’),171 the parties to an agreement are required to conduct their own ‘self 
assessment’ of the application of Article 81(1) EC. 
 
In the following paragraphs, a possible application of each of the four criteria set out in 
Article 81(3) to tramp shipping pools will be examined. The assessment will take into 
account the Maritime Guidelines, the Commission’s “Guidelines on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty”172 and relevant case law. It should be noted here that the third 
condition of indispensability of the restrictions will be discussed before the second 
condition regarding fair share of benefits to consumers because considerations of whether 
consumers would obtain a fair share of any resulting benefit does not arise in the event that 
an agreement fails the indispensability test.173 
 
3.3.1 Efficiency gains. 
 
The undertakings participating in a pool agreement have to demonstrate that the pool 
produces the benefits listed in Article 81(3), i.e. it improves the transport services or it 
promotes technical or economic progress. Any benefit produced by a tramp shipping pool 
must be something of objective value to the Community as a whole, not a private benefit to 
the pool members themselves;174 the generated efficiencies cannot be cost savings that are 
an inherent part of the reduction of competition but must result from the integration of 
economic activities. For methodological reasons, the different types of efficiencies listed in 
                                                 
170 See Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, op. cit., p. 347, Joined Cases C- 
204/00 P, Aalborg Portland A/S and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I-123, para. 79. 
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172 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty”, OJ C 101, 
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173 Ibid., para. 89. 
174 See Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, op. cit., p. 348. See also Case T-
65/98, Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission [2003] ECR II-4653, para. 139. 
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Article 81(3) EC can be divided into cost efficiencies and efficiencies of a qualitative 
nature.175 
 
A. Cost efficiencies.  
 
The factors allowing tramp shipping pools to generate cost efficiencies are: (i) the 
increased capacity utilisation and output, (ii) economies of scale and (iii) economies of 
scope.  
 
(i) Increased capacity utilisation and output: A pool has available a larger fleet than pool 
members would have independently, and thus, it is able for a more rational fleet utilisation 
since a reduction in the number of ballast voyages can be achieved by spreading the fleet 
geographically. In addition, due to synergies resulting from an integration of the pool 
members’ assets, the shipowners participating in the pool may be able to attain a 
cost/output configuration that would not otherwise be possible.176 Therefore, pool members 
can save costs and provide higher quality of services without having to acquire more 
vessels.  
 
(ii) Economies of scale: Cost efficiencies may also result from economies of scale, i.e. 
declining cost per unit of output as output increases.177 A tramp shipping pool might 
achieve economies of scale through various ways. First, a pool will have stronger 
negotiating power when purchasing goods or services necessary for its operation; hence, 
the cost of the provided transport services will be decreased. Secondly, cost savings can be 
attained by the centralisation of management and sharing of human resources. For example, 
a single individual member of staff can efficiently manage up to ten vessels at any time, 
dealing with all the chartering arrangements and contract negotiations. As a consequence, a 
shipowner, who trades his vessels individually, will need a fleet consisting of at least ten 
                                                 
175 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty”, op.  cit., para. 59. 
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vessels in order to fully employ an employee.178 Thirdly, shipowners can share through 
pools costs related to the training of the crew and personnel.  
 
In many cases the existence of economies of scale is a demand-driven need. For instance, 
in the tanker markets charterers enjoy considerable market strength. As a result, owners 
with a limited number of vessels would not be able to survive in those markets if they 
decided to trade individually.179  
 
(iii) Economies of scope: Economies of scope are another source of cost efficiency. 
Economies of scope occur when pools achieve cost savings by providing different services 
on the basis of the same input.180 Pools, by comprising more vessels, are able to offer 
different types of transport contracts, and thus, they can meet more efficiently their 
customers’ individual demands. More specifically, if a pool’s fleet consists of vessels of 
different types and sizes, then it is able to offer a wider scope of services to its clients. 
Furthermore, some pools enter into long-term agreements with terminals in all major ports 
or invest in their own terminals and storage facilities making them available for the benefit 
of their customers.181 
 
B. Efficiencies of a qualitative nature. 
 
Pools may also generate efficiencies of a qualitative nature, e.g. technical and technological 
advances or improvements in the distribution chain. For example, due to economies of 
scale afforded by the pools, investment in more sophisticated IT systems is possible. Such 
systems allow the shippers, consignees and pool members to monitor continuously the 
voyage and to have updated itineraries and documentation relating to their cargo.182 In 
addition, pools may facilitate investments in the building of more technologically advanced 
vessels. This is of significance particularly in the trade of products where expensive and 
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180 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty”, op. cit., para. 67. 
181 Fearnley’s Report, op. cit., para. 1600. 
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specialised vessels are required, such as chemical tankers, reeferships or OHBCs. Finally, 
investments made by the pool in port facilities improve the quality of the provided 
transport services as a whole since these facilities are usually available not only to the 
pooled vessels but to vessels outside the pool as well. 
 
 
3.3.2 Indispensability of the restrictions. 
 
A pool agreement must not impose restrictions on its parties, which are not indispensable to 
the attainment of the abovementioned efficiencies. The indispensability condition implies a 
two-fold test. First, it should be considered whether the pool agreement itself is necessary 
in order to achieve the efficiencies; and secondly, whether individual restrictions flowing 
from the pool agreement are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the efficiencies.183 
 
A. The efficiencies must be specific to the agreement. 
 
The first part of the two-fold test requires that the efficiencies are specific to the pool 
agreement, in the sense that there are no other economically practicable and less restrictive 
means of achieving the efficiencies. It should be examined, for example, whether the 
parties could have achieved the efficiencies on their own.184  
 
As it has been mentioned under 3.1, the key feature of standard shipping pools is joint 
selling. Indispensability of the pool agreement should be viewed especially in connection 
with the price fixing elements185 resulting from the integration of the joint sales function. In 
most pools, the PMC is responsible for the commercial and operational management, i.e., 
among others, the deployment of vessels and negotiation of freight rates. This enables the 
pool to achieve cost savings due to economies of scale or scope. It is hardly to be 
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understood how these efficiencies would be attained if the PMC were deprived of the price 
fixing functions. Internal price competition would likely decrease pool’s flexibility to 
deploy the pooled vessels in a more rational way, and thus compete more efficiently with 
other operators outside it. In addition, it will be more difficult for the pool to reach 
economies of scale or scope since it will not be able to maximise the revenue earning 
potential of the fleet without integrated commercial functions. In any event, the assessment 
of whether the undertakings participating in the pool could have attained the same 
efficiencies on their own should consider, inter alia, what is the minimum efficient scale to 
provide the various types of services in tramp shipping.186 To estimate the minimum 
efficient scale, one has to determine the level of output required to minimize average cost 
and exhaust economies of scale. The larger the minimum efficient scale compared to each 
pool member’s size, the more likely it is that the efficiencies will be deemed to be specific 
to the pool agreement.187 Moreover, pool agreements can be presumed to be necessary for 
the attainment of the efficiencies because they produce synergies through the combination 
of the parties’ assets.188 
 
B. The indispensability of individual restrictions. 
 
The second part of the two-fold test requires that the individual restrictions flowing from 
the pool agreement are indispensable. The pool members have to prove that both the nature 
and the intensity of any agreement are reasonably necessary to produce the claimed 
efficiencies.189 A restriction will be deemed indispensable if its absence would eliminate or 
significantly reduce the efficiencies that follow from the agreement or make it significantly 
less likely that they will materialise.190 The more restrictive a restraint is, the stricter the 
indispensability test will be.191  
                                                 
186 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81EC Treaty to maritime transport 
services”, op. cit., para. 76. 
187 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty”, op. cit., para. 76. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid., para. 78. 
190 Ibid., para. 79. 
191 Ibid. See Case T-86/95, Compagnie Générale Maritime and others v Commission [2002] ECR II-1011, 
paragraphs 162 et seq. 
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The most common restriction contained in the pool agreements is the non-compete clause 
(see 3.2.3.B). It is questionable whether a non-compete clause is indispensable to the 
attainment of the efficiencies. It can be argued that non-compete restrictions contribute to 
the cohesion of the pool’s fleet; hence the pool is able to achieve the cost efficiencies 
described earlier. However, this argument is of relevance for those non-compete clauses 
that simply do not permit a shipowner to use his/her pooled vessel outside the pool because 
in such case PMC’s available capacity will be uncertain and its flexibility in performing 
transport contracts reduced. Non-compete clauses, which cover activities other than those 
in which the pool trades or extend to vessels trading in different areas, are highly unlikely 
to pass the indispensability test. Another aspect that should be taken into account is the fact 
that non-compete clauses might actually have pro-competitive effects in the sense that they 
can prevent the risk of coordination between apparently independent undertakings and the 
pools in which they are members. The assessment of a non-compete clause’s 
indispensability has also to consider the length of the restriction. Generally, in my opinion, 
non-compete restrictions are not likely to be found indispensable to the efficiencies; and if 
they are, their length should be limited to a period that allows the pool to establish itself in 
the market. 
 
Another common restriction is the notice periods contained in the exit clauses (see 3.2.3.B). 
Notice periods usually range from six to twelve months both for withdrawal of vessels 
from the pool and withdrawal from the pool as a whole.192 Notice periods secure the 
PMC’s ability to enter into long term transport contracts by preventing sudden withdrawals. 
In addition, notice periods allow the pool to plan its investment policy and thus to achieve 
the qualitative efficiencies mentioned under 3.3.1.B. Even notice periods longer than 
twelve months can be found indispensable if the pool agreement demonstrates high degree 
of integration; for instance, a pool member makes significant investments based on the fact 
that the rest of the participants in the pool will contribute or remain in the pool for a longer 
                                                 
192 According to the findings of Fearnley’s Report, op. cit. 
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period. Therefore, it can be assumed that notice periods are indispensable to the attainment 
of the efficiencies in relation to the extent of integration that a pool has. 
 
 
3.3.3 Fair share of benefits to consumers. 
 
The consumers must receive a fair share of the benefits generated by the pool agreement. 
The term “consumers” should be deemed to encompass direct users (both natural persons 
and undertakings) of the maritime transport services, i.e. shippers, cargo owners and 
generally charterers, and indirect users as well, i.e. the final consumers in the supply 
chain.193 As a “fair share” would amount a pass-on of benefits to consumers that at least 
compensates them for any actual or likely negative impact caused to them by the restriction 
of competition found under Article 81(1) EC. The net effect of the pool agreement on the 
consumers must at least be neutral.194 Moreover, it is the beneficial effects on all 
consumers in the relevant market that must be considered, and not the effect on each 
individual consumer.195 
 
The cost efficiencies, as described above under 3.3.1, produced by the pool could accrue a 
fair share to consumers in various ways. First, the economies of scale and scope allow the 
pool to offer customers a variety of services and hence to meet each individual transport 
demand more effectively. Secondly, a pool has greater availability of vessels and increased 
capacity; thus, it can perform more complicated journeys and satisfy owners that have large 
cargo volumes. Thirdly, centralisation of administration and joint purchasing of the 
products needed to carry out voyages reduce the cost of the provided services, as a result a 
lowering of freight rates is possible. Qualitative benefits are more likely to be passed-on to 
                                                 
193 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty”, op. cit., para. 84. 
194 Ibid., para. 85. See also Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v Commission, op. cit., p. 
348, where the Court states that an improvement “must in particular show appreciable objective advantages of 
such a character as to compensate for the disadvantages which they cause in the field of competition”.  
195 Case C-238/05, Asnex-Equifax v Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bacarios (Ausbanc), op. cit., para. 
70, where the Court states that “it is the beneficial nature of the effect on all consumers in the relevant 
markets that must be taken into consideration, not the effect on each member of that category of consumers”. 
 46 
consumers. As it was mentioned earlier (under 3.3.1), investments in IT systems allow 
shippers to have better control over their cargo. In addition, pools can offer higher quality 
of services by investing in technologically advanced vessels and port facilities. In certain 
cases, qualitative benefits can be more significant even than price reductions for customers 
that transport high value commodities, and consequently, look for stability, security and 
reliability in transport services.  
 
 
3.3.4 No elimination of competition. 
 
The fourth condition of Article 81(3) EC requires that the pool agreement does not afford 
its parties the possibility of eliminating competition in a substantial part of the market. In 
examining whether the fourth condition applies, one should consider the various sources of 
competition in the tramp shipping market, the level of competitive constraint that they 
impose on the parties to the pool agreement and the impact of the agreement on this 
competitive constraint. Both actual and potential competition must be taken into account 
when making this assessment.196 
 
The degree of actual competition in the market should not be assessed solely on the basis of 
market shares. What also matters is the capacity of actual competitors to compete.197 In the 
case of tramp shipping pools, the evidence198 indicated that they were not able to use their 
joint resources and combined market power to raise prices in substantial parts of the 
market. Pool’s ability to cause any distortions is significantly mitigated by the structure of 
the tramp shipping sector (see for details 2.2.1, where the high competitiveness of the 
sector and its dependence on the trade patterns were described). However, it might be the 
case that pools operating in more specialised segments of the market (e.g. LNG or 
                                                 
196 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty”, op. cit., para. 108. 
 
197 Ibid., para. 109. 
198 See Fearnley’s Report, op. cit., para. 1676. 
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chemicals) take advantage of their expertise and power in that specific market and use them 
to the detriment of competition.  
 
The assessment of entry barriers should take into account a number of factors,199 such as 
the cost of entry including sunk costs, the minimum efficient scale within the industry, the 
competitive strengths of potential entrants and the position of buyers. Generally, tramp 
shipping market is deemed to have low entry barriers (see 2.2.3.A.(iii) potential 
competition).  
 
 
3.4 The block exemption for specialisation agreements: Regulation 2658/00.200 
 
As it was explained under 3.2.2, a pool might amount as production joint venture if its 
centre of gravity lies on joint production. In that case, it has to be considered if the pool 
agreement benefits from the Specialisation Block Exemption.201 The block exception 
applies on condition that the combined market share cap of participating undertakings does 
not exceed 20 per cent of the relevant market.202 Furthermore, the exemption extends to 
purchasing and marketing agreements contained in the joint production agreement.203 
Agreements incorporating any of the hardcore restrictions, namely (a) the fixing of prices 
when selling the products to third parties; (b) the limitation of output or sales; and (c) the 
allocation of markets or customers,204 will be excluded from the block exemption. 
Nevertheless, the block exemption will still found to be applicable either in the case that 
the parties set the capacity and production volume of the production joint venture, or in the 
case that the parties set sales targets and the fix the prices that a production joint venture 
                                                 
199 European Commission, “Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty”, op. cit., para. 115. 
200 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements [2000] OJ L 304/3.   
201 See Article 1(1)(c), Commission Regulation 2658/2000, op. cit., where it is stated that the term 
‘specialisation agreement’ covers “joint production agreements, by virtue of which two or more parties agree 
to produce certain products jointly”. 
202 See Article 4, Commission Regulation 2658/2000, op. cit. See further Article 6 for the rules on how to 
apply the market share threshold. 
203 See Article 3, Commission Regulation 2658/2000, op. cit. 
204 See Article 5(1), Commission Regulation 2658/2000, op. cit. 
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charges to its immediate customers.205 The Specialisation Block Exemption will expire on 
31 December 2010.206  
 
Due to the limits of this paper, a detailed analysis of a potential application of the 
Specialisation Block Exemption to tramp shipping pools is not possible. However, taking 
into account that in any event each pool must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, a few 
remarks, which should be considered when assessing the application of Specialisation 
Block Exemption, will be enumerated. First, according to Article 2(4) of the Reg. 2658/00, 
the term ‘product’ means “a good and/or a service, including both intermediary goods 
and/or services and final goods and/or services, with the exception of distribution and 
rental services”; in the context of transport service providers in tramp shipping, it is not 
clear if the provision of services by a pool should be considered as distribution of services 
that a shipowner provides to the PMC, and thus, not be encompassed by the term ‘product’. 
Secondly, according to Article 1(1)(c), the term ‘specialisation agreement’ covers “joint 
production agreements, by virtue of which two or more parties agree to produce certain 
products jointly”; here, it should be examined whether pool agreement specifies explicitly 
which services the pool intends to provide. Thirdly, according to Article 1(2), the block 
exemption “shall also apply to provisions contained in specialisation agreements, which do 
not constitute the primary object of such agreements, but are directly related to and 
necessary for their implementation”; hence, in order for a pool agreement to be covered by 
the block exemption, it should not contain any restrictive provisions that are not 
indispensable for its implementation. 
 
It is obvious that if a pool agreement is found to be covered by the Specialisation Block 
Exemption, then a number of features of a tramp shipping pool that raise anti-competitive 
concerns could be ‘justified’. For example, the pool members could fix prices to be charged 
to their immediate customers207 or agree on the output of the pool.208 
                                                 
205 See Article 5(2), Commission Regulation 2658/2000, op. cit. 
206 See Article 9, Commission Regulation 2658/2000, op. cit. 
207 See Article 5(2)(b), Commission Regulation 2658/2000, op. cit. 
208 See Article 5(2)(a), Commission Regulation 2658/2000, op. cit. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The implementation of Regulation 1419/2006 marked the beginning of a new era for the 
whole tramp shipping sector. From now on tramp shipping industry will be treated as any 
other industry under the EC competition rules. Naturally, this fact raises a variety of issues 
regarding the application of those rules to a sector that has never been systematically 
investigated by the European (both Community and national) competition authorities. This 
paper attempted to deal with those issues and the following concluding remarks could be 
made. 
 
First, the characterisation of a transport service as a tramp vessel service does not preclude 
anymore the implementation of the EC competition rules. Nevertheless, it reveals that the 
special features of the tramp shipping sector (e.g. its international dimension, the volatility 
of the demand side, the segmentation of the sector etc.) should be considered when 
delineating the relevant market for competition law purposes. 
 
Secondly, the principal form of cooperation between carriers in the tramp sector is the 
shipping pool. Generally, a pool agreement, depending on where its centre of gravity lies, 
might count either as commercialisation agreement if its key feature is joint selling, or as 
production agreement if the parties agree to jointly produce certain services. In order to 
determine the centre of gravity, one should examine the starting point of the cooperation 
and the degree of integration of the different functions which are being combined. This 
point is critical since the treatment of a pool agreement under competition law will be 
differentiated according to its characterisation as commercialisation or production 
agreement.  
 
Thirdly, a pool agreement that amounts as a commercialisation agreement is most likely to 
be found to infringe Article 81(1) EC unless its parties are not actual or potential 
competitors, which rarely might be the case, or would not otherwise be able to provide the 
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services covered by the pool independently. Pools limited to joint selling will be deemed to 
have as their object the restriction of competition, and thus, will always fall within the 
prohibition of Article 81(1) EC. These pools will be caught by Article 81(1) EC even if 
their market shares are below the thresholds set by the De Minimis Notice because joint 
selling entails price fixing, which is considered hardcore restriction excluding the 
application of the de minimis doctrine. However, the possibilities that the competition 
authorities would initiate proceedings against pools with insignificant market shares are 
limited. As a consequence, it will be necessary to examine whether a pool qualifies for an 
exemption pursuant to Article 81(3) EC. Generally, tramp shipping pools seem to fulfill the 
four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) EC since they produce gain efficiencies (i.e. 
increased capacity utilisation and output, economies of scale/scope and qualitative benefits) 
that accrue a fair share to consumers (e.g. increased quality and variety of transport 
services and potential lowering in prices); their restrictive provisions, depending on how 
intensive they are, could be considered indispensable to the attainment of these efficiencies; 
and in most cases they are not found to be capable of eliminating competition in substantial 
parts of the market. 
 
Fourthly, a pool that counts as a production joint venture will be assessed under different 
terms. Price fixing elements of the pool agreement should be viewed as a necessary 
consequence of the integration of capacity for the provision of transport services. Hence, an 
analysis of its effects on competition in the relevant market is required in order to conclude 
whether or not the pool falls within Article 81(1) EC. Moreover, it has to be examined if 
the pool could benefit from the Specialisation Block Exemption. In my opinion, it is not 
unlikely at all tramp shipping pools to be covered by this block exemption.  
 
Fifthly, a tramp shipping pool with high degree of integration that performs on a lasting 
basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity and meets the thresholds of 
Regulation 139/2004 will in fact account for a full-function joint venture. 
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Given the fact that there are no per se illegal agreements in the EC competition law system, 
the undertakings have to perform their own ‘self assessment’ of their practices. This might 
lead the ‘players’ of the tramp sector to reconsider its structure and reform the organisation 
of their activities. For example, it is likely that undertakings choose to integrate their 
functions to a higher degree creating in that way more independent entities. In any event, 
legal certainty will be achieved as soon as there is a ruling by the European Courts.  
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